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[The following article is reprinted fromthe Yemen Times, Vol.IV, No. 27, July 11-17, 1994, p.8]
Many people are still wondering about manyaspects of the war between the government and separatist forces.There are many things that cannot be rationally explained. I havetried hard to dig deep into some aspects of the war to determine howit was won. I realize beforehand that this subject has not beendiscussed in the media, and that it may generate some fiercecriticism. My consolation is that our rulers still believe infreedom of the press, and that there is no maliceinvolved.
I believe there are some vital factorsinvolved in the way the war was directed and fought. Let me detailsome of them below.
1. An Objective with MoralStrength:
The government or legitimacy forces werefighting to keep the country together. They had a cause. Theexistence of this cause and objective has given the army of theRepublic of Yemen moral strength. On the other hand, the forcesfighting for the separatists did not have a clear objective. Moreover, the commanders knew their politicians were implicated insubservient relations to some of the neighboring countries. Thecommanders and soldiers saw their politicians receiving orders fromnot-so-neighborly neighbors. As a result, the enthusiasm and energyof the government army were much superior to those of theseparatists. This made a difference.
2. Popular Support:
The government forces felt the backing andsupport of the people, even when they moved into the southern andeastern governorates.
The support of the people was visible inmany ways:
a) The caravan of food supplies, finallyreaching about a hundred, came out from all governorates of theformer North Yemen and poured into the war zones.
b) There was a tremendous drive to makefinancial contributions to the war effort.
c) Volunteers from southern and northernYemenis joined the fighting early in the war.
d) Residents of the southern and easterngovernorates refused to enlist in the army of the separatists, thusdepriving them of a badly needed manpower.
e) Residents of the southern and easterngovernorates guided the government forces to the hidings and camps ofthe separatists and showed them where mines were planted.
3. Buying the YSP Troops:
The commanders of the separatist (YSP)forces and camps knew their politicians were receiving generouscontributions in cash and arms from some of the country's neighbors. Not much of this filtered through to the commanders and theirsoldiers. Moreover, these people saw no reason to die just becausethe separatist politicians wanted to become rulers or they wanted tocontinue to receive generous "contributions.'' So, when…an'¡' offered a few million here and a few million there,the commanders were ready to deal. One after another, the YSP camps"surrendered'' and changed allegiance. The 14th October Camp, theMadram Camp, the 56th Infantry, the 122nd Mechanic Camp, the 22ndInfantry Camp, the 4th Artillery Camp, the Rocket Base in Shabwah,etc. One after another surrendered.
It is estimated that in total, YR 282million has been paid out to buy the commanders and their assistantsin those camps, according to AFP sources. Another YR 200 million waspaid out to the tribal sheikhs and community elders to smooth theadvance of the government forces. That is a very low price comparedto the loss in lives and hardware had the southern brigades notshifted their allegiance.
Contact with the key officers and commandersin the YSP army had long been established and the deals wereconsummated in some cases even before the war. According to onebusinessman in …an'¡', "If less than $5 million helped reinin so many camps, we would have been willing to pay ten times thatamount to the YSP secessionists to spare us the waraltogether.''
4. Stalling Tactics:
The Sanaa politicians, headed by President'Ali 'Abd Allah Salih, realized from early on in the war that thesecessionists would be defeated. It was just a matter of time. Sothey played a stalling game superbly. They exchanged roles amongthemselves, and reacted calmly to all regional and internationalefforts "to resolve the war through negotiations.'' Arab Leagueefforts were entertained for about two weeks and then snubbed. UNefforts were given a longer stretch &emdash; but always with theintention of determining events in Yemen on the battleground. Dr.al-Iryani was able to handle effectively the media, diplomats inSanaa and abroad, and the adversaries in a smooth but decisive way. "At the end, things will be determined on the (battle) ground,'' heoften repeated. He was right.
Sanaa needed time to finish the job. But italso wanted to take off the heat applied by the neighbors. The onlyway to achieve both is to stall, and it was given it, courtesy ofPrince Bandar and his UN Security Council maneuvers. The delayingtactics frustrated and demoralized the separatists who watched thegovernment forces gain inches every day.
5. Friends in Need:
Yemen had some good friends who came to itsrescue. Within the region, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, theSudan, Qatar, Eritrea, Iran and Libya sided with Sanaa. Sanaa didnot overplay its supporters so as not to scare the West. Manycountries, however, vacillated. Among the Western countries, Germanyand France deserve a special mention. Those two countries backedSanaa from the very beginning and kept their line. That is whytoday, they have secured a special place in the hearts of Yemenis,and in the politics of Sanaa.
6. A United Internal Front:
Whatever differences there were amongYemenis, they were put aside as the people of Yemen rallied aroundthe president. Help came from two sources. When Ali Salem al-Beidhannounced his separate state, he lost whatever following he had among the people of Yemen. That made many people, especially inTa'izz and among the Bak£l tribes rethink their positions androles. Then came the Saudi role. Saudi bullying made the Yemenisstubborn in their fight against the secessionists who were now seenas Saudi agents and traitors. The two steps have created a secureand strong internal front among the people of Yemen. This could nowbe used to launch reforms and reconstruction efforts to build a newYemen.
7. Unified Command:
Finally there is the element of a unifiedcommand, personified by President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The governmentforces had one leader, they obeyed him, and together they camethrough. The separatists had a divided leadership. First there wasAli Salem al-Beidh and his team. Soon, he left Aden, and Abd al-RahimAl-Jifri took charge. He was often complaining of insubordination bythe YSP officers who could not comprehend how they could receiveinstructions from a person the party has, for so long, described as atraitor and agent. Then there was the old leadership of the 1960srepresented by Makkawi, al-Asnaj and others, who formed their ownpower bases. Finally, there were the tribal leaders like BinSuraimah and others who worked independently of every one else. Asplintered separatist leadership cost them a lot.
In my opinion, those seven factors played akey role in bringing victory to the Republic of Yemen against theseparatists and in consolidating the unity of the nation.
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